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ABSTRACT
This article explores the relationship between elite and citizen dis-
courses on European integration. We argue that imperfections in cue-
making and cue-taking lead to a gap between elite and citizen dis-
courses, especially in societies experiencing major changes. To investi-
gate this, we use newly collected data from Serbia shortly after the
delayed start of accession negotiations in 2014. Using vignettes for
diﬀerent citizen discourses, we coded statements collected frommajor
Serbian newspapers. The analysis shows that citizen discourses found
in previous research are all represented in the media. We also ﬁnd that
approximately one fourth of media content does not ﬁt any of the
citizen discourses in Serbia. This gap conﬁrms our hypothesis and
demonstrates that elite ‘communicative’ discourses are not well linked
to citizen discourses, leading to politically important imperfections.
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1. Introduction
European political leaders and scholars on the European Union (EU) have long under-
estimated the role of citizens in the process of deepening and widening European
integration (Hobolt and de Vries 2016). In particular, enlargement as a policy does not
have formal instruments for citizens in candidate countries to participate at an early stage.
The question arises whether political elites are suﬃciently able to convince or connect to
citizens in formulating a shared perspective on enlargement. If this process hampers,
either through elites not being able to convince citizens or citizens not being able to
connect to national elites, the legitimacy of political decision-making will be at risk.
Focusing on citizens and elites, we propose to bring discourses back into the analysis of
EU enlargement. We understand political discourses as ‘shared means of making sense of
the world, embedded in language [. . .] [and] grounded in the assumptions, judgments,
contentions, dispositions and capabilities of citizens, enabling them to construct shared
or common narratives’ (Dryzek 2000, 18). Interestingly, discourses, including the ones
explored in this contribution, are neither temporally ﬁxed, nor rootless and easy to change
(Risse 2010). Rather, they provide stability by being embedded in historical legacies and
systems of values (Dryzek and Holmes 2002). However, there is some ﬂexibility in how
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these deeper meanings are shaped and reshaped by political elites and the media
(Dimitrova, Kortenska, and Steunenberg 2015). It is this gap between elite and citizen
discourses, which we explore empirically in this article, that can produce political dissent
and undermine the process of integration (Dryzek and Holmes 2002, 6).
Discursive approaches to European integration have mainly focused on the politiciza-
tion of EU issues in domestic arenas (Leconte 2015). An important point of departure is
Schmidt’s (2006, 2010) framework distinguishing between coordinative and communica-
tive types of elite discourses. The coordinative type refers to the way elites debate
European policy. The communicative type is how elites communicate and justify their
decisions at the EU level to the general public in Member States. We share the view that
political discourses are both shaped by the speciﬁc institutional context, while simulta-
neously inﬂuencing it through the arguments and justiﬁcations they contain. Still,
Schmidt’s framework views citizens as recipients rather than active participants in the
construction of domestic discourses. In contrast, citizen discourses have been explored in
a limited number of studies. Steunenberg, Petek, and Rüth (2011) focus on citizen
discourses about European integration in Germany and Turkey, which suggest that
Turkish membership is unlikely, based on existing discourses in these countries.
Hurrelmann, Gora, and Wagner (2015) identiﬁed discourses constructed by citizens
about European integration through focus groups as a way to evaluate the level of
politicization of European issues. Recent research has started to pay more attention to
citizens perceptions and discourses (Baglioni and Hurrelmann 2016; Duchesne et al. 2013;
Gaxie, Hube, and Rowell 2011; Ingelgom 2014), although these studies rarely focus on the
issue of EU enlargement.
Within this literature, the links between political elites’ discourses, media rhetoric, and
citizen discourses remain unclear, partially due to limited empirical evidence about these
connections. In this article, we focus on the link between communicative (elite) discourses
(as they are presented in the media) and citizen discourses. Following Schmidt, we
separate between the elite ‘internal’ discourses from communicative ones used in
national media. We argue that in stable societies, the diﬀerences between citizens and
elites will be minimal leading to a negligible gap between their discourses. This is
indicated by our base-line hypothesis regarding substantial alignment between both
groups. However, in a society in which major change occurs, driven by various events,
imperfections in cue-making and cue-taking may lead to a gap between elite and citizen
discourses. This is our limited-overlap-hypothesis about the correspondence between
discourses of both groups, which will be put to a test in this article.
To test our hypotheses, we use the case of Serbia, which started accession negotiations
in 2014 after years of uncertainty. While the prospect of membership was initiated in 2003,
Serbia’s initial reluctant cooperation regarding the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the normalization of Belgrade-Pristina relations appeared to
be important barriers for a swift process. Oﬃcial negotiations began in January 2014, but
actual negotiations of the ﬁrst two chapters started at the end of the year. These events,
which relate both to the legacies of recent wars, and a new prospect of participating in the
EU, have substantial implications for Serbian society and discourses. As a consequence,
Serbia serves as an obvious case in which diﬀerences between elites and citizens could be
observed and the base-line hypothesis of substantial alignment is expected to be
rejected.
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In our research, we use the citizen discourses identiﬁed by Dimitrova and Kortenska
(2016) and compare these with statements from Serbian newspapers. Our analysis shows
that of the four citizen discourses identiﬁed before, the one supporting Serbia’s accession
to the EU is also the one with the highest level of occurrence in Serbian media. In contrast,
the discourse which vocally opposes enlargement and rejects Serbia’s integration is least
represented in newspaper statements that we collected. The other two citizen discourses
are equally prevalent. We also ﬁnd that approximately one fourth of the media statements
does not match any of the four discourses among citizens. These media statements, which
do not belong to any of the citizen discourses, reﬂect a mismatch between the elite and
citizen discourses in Serbia. It ﬁts with our limited-overlap-hypothesis, which indicates that
elite and citizen discourses do not necessarily always match in periods of major societal
change.
The article proceeds as follows: we ﬁrst discuss our expectations in view of the current
literature on discourses and cueing. The next section explains our research design and
methods in order to research our hypotheses about public-elite gap. Finally, we present
the results of our analysis of media statements and discuss what their implications are for
the current literature.
2. European integration, public opinion, and political discourses
In understanding the relationship between political elites and citizens and their positions
on European integration, scholars have argued that citizens rely on shortcuts or ‘proxies’
from their domestic context when forming their opinions on EU matters (Ray 2003;
Hooghe and Marks 2005; Steenbergen, Edwards, and de Vries 2007). Citizens lack interest,
awareness, and knowledge about the integration process and its impact on their own
lives (Hobolt 2007). These studies suggest that a supportive opinion towards EU integra-
tion is primarily a result of the generally pro-EU positions of parties in government.
However, this relationship is not straightforward. Ray (2003, 272) found that this eﬀect
of party positions on the electorate is conditioned by disagreement among parties, party
unity, issue salience, and an individual’s attachment to a party. Hooghe and Marks (2005)
found that increased contestation of European integration among domestic political
elites results in increasingly negative public attitudes towards the EU.
The use of shortcuts or cues is, of course, embedded in the media context in which
information is transmitted. Political parties and elites refer to diﬀerent arguments in their
communication to supporters. For example, Maier, Adam, and Maier (2012) showed that
some cues have stronger eﬀects over others depending on the domestic political context.
Moreover, media content analyses coupled with survey data provide evidence of media
framing and priming eﬀects on positive and negative stances towards EU enlargement.
Azrout, Van Spanje, and De Vreese (2012) found that domestic media have greater
inﬂuence on public sentiment to EU enlargement than individual information exposure.
De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2006) observed that the visibility of news on EU matters
inﬂuences public opinion in the Netherlands and Denmark. Moreover, the consistency in
tone of news moderates the negative eﬀects of media on public opinion.
While the media seems to be important for transmitting cues from elites, the under-
lying arguments and justiﬁcations about European integration are grounded in dis-
courses. Hurrelmann, Gora, and Wagner (2015) argued that the politicization of
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European integration is best approached as a discursive phenomenon. They distinguish
three arenas of political discourse, which are the institutional, intermediate, and citizenry
discursive arenas. The institutional arena is ‘at the core of the political systems’ and is
populated by full-time policy-makers, politicians, and legislators. The intermediate arenas
are those bridging the policy-making process with the broader citizenry (Hurrelmann,
Gora, and Wagner 2015, 45). These two arenas reﬂect Schmidt’s (2006) distinction
between coordinative and communicative discourses. While coordinative discourses are
foremost linked to the institutional arena where policies are made, communicative dis-
courses are used by elites, in the intermediate arena, bridging their policy decisions to
citizens.
An important question is whether these ‘bridging’ discourses, as found in the inter-
mediate arena, do indeed link elites with citizens and if so what the arguments and
justiﬁcations are that connect them. Comparing elite discourses with survey trends,
Herranz-Surrallés (2012) identiﬁes a public-elite gap due to diﬀerences between coordi-
native and communicative discourses in Germany about enlargement. The European
coordinative discourse relies on arguments and justiﬁcations in favor of the Eastern
enlargement, including solidarity, responsibility for peace and democracy, and
European identity of the candidate countries, which remained more or less stable over
various rounds of enlargement. In contrast, in their communicative discourse in Germany,
political elites used diﬀerent sets of justiﬁcations customized to every successive round of
EU enlargement (Herranz-Surrallés 2012, 393).
These ﬁndings indicate that substantial diﬀerences may exist between what citizens
really think about European integration and what elites want them to think as part of their
communicative discourse. Crucially, Herranz-Surrallés (2012) does not research citizen
discourses, but relies on public opinion research. In this article, we research citizen
discourses and compare these with communicative discourses of political elites in
Serbia. We expect that these will not ﬁt one-to-one. In addition, we will focus on the
main arguments and issues that are central to these discourses, indicating what their
diﬀerenceswill be. When these arguments and issues diﬀer and do not match, we speak of
a gap. A gap between discourses is not only a matter of degree, but a diﬀerence in terms
of the main underlying arguments and justiﬁcations. This is a result of our earlier
conceptualization of discourses based on Dryzek and others. Discourses are internally
coherent and provide a shared understanding of the world, while individuals may sub-
scribe to these ideas to a diﬀerent extent. As a consequence, any diﬀerence or gap
between discourses can be traced back to these underlying arguments, which results in
diﬀerent understandings of the world.
A related question concerns the connection between elite and citizen discourses. As
suggested in Schmidt’s framework, ‘communicative’ discourses of elites seem to be fore-
most a ‘one-way’ street aﬀecting citizens. Others, however, propose a ‘two-way road’ in
communicating between elites and citizens. Steenbergen, Edwards, and de Vries (2007)
provide evidence that cueing and oﬀering shortcuts has a dual nature in which both
groups react to each other. If cueing works – from elites to citizens and from citizens to
elites – we would expect to ﬁnd the same arguments and justiﬁcations to drive the
discourses of both groups – whether they belong to a communicative or citizen discourse.
Based on this position, information is expected to ﬂow, without any change or obstacles,
from elites to citizens and vice versa. Furthermore, there is limited competition in the
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interpretation of important events, so that citizens as well as elites may continue using
similar cues in their statements based on the underlying system of values underpinning
discourses. As a result, citizens and elites share the same discourses, which is formulated
as our base-line expectation:
Base-line hypothesis (substantial alignment): there is no gap between citizen and elite
discourses.
The base-line hypothesis assumes a consistent and continuous exchange between elites
and citizens regarding the interpretation of main events through discourses. However,
one can imagine environments in which major events occur that are important to social
and political life. These new events require elites as well as citizens to interpret and
express what these events ‘mean’ in terms of the underlying discursive arguments and
justiﬁcations. New interpretations may arise resulting in new cues for which it is not clear
how these will be re-interpreted and understood by the cue-takers. Viewed in this way,
new events challenge the exchange between elites and citizens as these events and the
way they are interpreted may make cue-takers doubtful following new cues of cue-
makers. This possibility is especially important to ‘political entrepreneurs’, who seek
a new political platform and electoral support, and want to oﬀer an alternative discourse
to existing ones.
Based on the process of continuing reinterpretation we expect that the links between
elite and citizen discourses will be weaker. The process of cue-making and cue-taking will
not be well aligned, especially when there are more events to be interpreted, which could
be related to important social changes. Occasionally, elites or citizens will use arguments
and justiﬁcations that will not be represented in the discourse of the other. This will be
reﬂected in a gap between communicative elite discourses and citizen discourses in the
sense that not all arguments and justiﬁcations of elites or citizens would be reproduced.
This position is expressed in our second, alternative hypothesis:
Alternative hypothesis (limited overlap): there is a gap between citizen and elite discourses.
In case of limited overlap, elites and citizens may participate in similar discourses, but
there may exist discourses in which these links are very limited or absent. Especially citizen
discourses, which involve a many more participants than elites, can be rather sensitive to
changes in the processes linking events to understandings through making and taking
cues. The existence of statements that are based on diﬀerent or new arguments and
justiﬁcations may serve as indicator of imperfect transmission, which leads to the
hypothesized gap.
3. Research methods and data
3.1. Serbia and citizen discourses
In order to research whether cueing is an imperfect process, which could lead to a gap
between elite and citizen discourses, we focus on Serbia as a setting in which major socio-
political changes have occurred. Since 2000, Serbia participated in a process of stabiliza-
tion and association with the EU, which in 2003 was upgraded to prepare Western Balkan
countries for membership. Though the Commission issued a favorable opinion to start
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Stabilization and Association Agreement negotiations with Belgrade in 2005, signing of
the deal was delayed until 2008 due to criticisms by the Netherlands about Serbian
cooperation with ICTY. The Netherlands blocked further steps until all indictees were
arrested and transferred to ICTY. The delayed start of the accession process in 2014 has
contributed to conﬂicting positions of political elites on Serbia’s accession over the last
decade (Stratulat 2014).
In our research, we focus on a period shortly after the oﬃcial start of accession
negotiations in 2014, making the issue of Serbian integration and Pristina-Belgrade
relations highly salient in the public and political debates. The stop-start trajectory of EU-
Serbia relations is mirrored in public attitudes towards European integration at that time.
Based on opinion polls, the percentage of those stating to vote for Serbian accession in
a hypothetical referendum fell from 64 percent in October 2009 to 44 percent in
December 2014 (MEI 2014b). The polls also show that Serbian citizens try to balance
the increased opportunities of EU membership due to mobility (especially for youth)
against extra conditionality related to arresting suspected war criminals and normalizing
bilateral relations with Kosovo (MEI 2014a).
In order to compare discourses between citizens and elites, we make use of a design in
which we build upon the results of previous research and collect new data based on
newspaper statements from the same period. Dimitrova and Kortenska (2016, 2017; also
Dimitrova et al 2015) studied citizen discourses in Serbia in the second half of 2014. They
identiﬁed, using Q methodology (McKeown and Thomas 2013), diﬀerent discourses
among citizens. In their application of this method, statements were collected through
focus groups, while the Q-sorts were done through a larger number of individual inter-
views in diﬀerent locations.
Based on their dataset, Dimitrova and Kortenska (2016) identiﬁed four diﬀerent
citizen discourses. One is a clear pro-European integration discourse (discourse
A ‘Cautiously Positive Expectation’), whilst another is a similarly unambiguous anti-EU
membership discourse (discourse B ‘Mistrust and Hostility’). A more nuanced perspec-
tive on accession is provided by two other discourses that seem to promote or oppose
moving to EU membership. These are discourse C (‘The Devil’s in the Conditions’) and
discourse D (‘Moving towards EU Rules and Institutions’). We use these citizen dis-
courses as the point of departure to code newspaper statements. The relatively low
correlations between these discourses shows that they contain unique statements,
which can be used to represent the content of each discourse separately.1 We will
use this feature in our analysis by deriving keywords that are typical for each discourse
in order to classify newspaper statements, which may reﬂect the views of elites in
Serbia.
3.2. Media-elite discourses: data collection
Political involvement in the media makes it often diﬃcult to discern political from journal-
istic activity in South-East Europe, including Serbia (Georgieva et al. 2015). This results in
a lack of journalistic independence in the Western Balkans (Milosavljević and Poler 2018),
where mainstreammedia are ‘colonized’ by political party elites. This type of state capture
of the media also aﬀects new EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe (Bajomi-
Lazar 2014). In our study, we can thus take newspaper statements to identify elite
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discourses in Serbia. As indicated by our limited-overlap-hypothesis, we are interested
whether a gap exists between these two groups.
In our study, we use statements from two Belgrade-based daily newspapers: Politika
and Danas. We selected these two outlets for two reasons. First, these publications
capture the dominant discourses of the Serbian establishment (Politika) and of the
opposition (Danas). Second, both newspapers have a searchable archive. Politika pub-
lished its ﬁrst issue in January 1904, and represents one of the oldest continuously
running newspapers in the Balkans (B92 2009). The daily is seen as the ‘newspaper of
record’ in Serbia, publishing news from a conservative ‘oﬃcial viewpoint’ (Radimirović
2015). At the beginning of the Milošević era in the 1980s, the Politika management was
replaced by supporters of the regime so that it could act as a government mouthpiece
(Jones 2015, 1902). Since then, the newspaper has regained editorial independence, but is
still viewed as the newspaper of the establishment.
The heritage of Danas is distinctly diﬀerent. This newspaper is seen as the Belgrade
daily for independent intellectuals. Danas was established in 1997 by a group of dissident
journalists who left Naša borba to start a daily independent of the regime. The medium
was targeted by the Milošević-led authorities repeatedly. In October 1998, the police
raided the oﬃces of Danas and the independent Dnevni Telegraf, ordered closure, and
placed the premises under armed guard (Smith 1998).
Statements on European integration were collected from both Politika and Danas from
articles published between 20 January and 20 February 2014. This corresponds to the
month right after Serbia had oﬃcially opened accession negotiations and approximately
at the time of conducting the focus groups in the country.2 A statement is deﬁned as
a complete thought about the question of enlargement and could consist of more than
one sentence. An example is the statement of Prime Minister Ivica Dačić, quoted in
Politika: ‘When one objectively examines the pros and cons the EU membership, only
the malicious may say that Serbia will not beneﬁt from joining the EU. Our goal is that
Serbia is part of Europe; we want the best for our people.’
A total of 216 statements were extracted from Politika, whilst an additional 68 state-
ments were collected from Danas. The statements were made by various actors, including
Serbian politicians, members of the Serbian negotiating team, EU oﬃcials, and member
state oﬃcials as well as experts. We did not distinguish between Serbian or EU elites in our
analysis, as they are equally relevant in their appearance in the media content. However,
we reﬂect on the elites when reporting the results. Multiple statements were extracted
from each article, as the articles are all about European integration. All statements were
coded and not just the ones that quote elites.
3.3. Coding media statements
Based on the results from the citizen discourse study conducted in Serbia, we develop
four sets of keywords that characterize and capture the broader meaning and interpreta-
tion of each discourse. Table 1 presents an example of our method for the Serbian
discourse of ‘Mistrust and hostility’. The way in which we also operationalized the four
discourses can be found in the supplementary material.3
The previous interpretation of the citizen discourses is based on a statistical analysis
of the factors using the centroid method (Dimitrova and Kortenska 2017). This
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interpretation relied on positive and negative distinguishing statements, which are
included in the ﬁrst column of Table 1. Here, the numbers between brackets represent
the respective number of the statement in the Q set of 64 statements, used in the
interviews. These statements and their rankings guided the generating of keywords,
presented in the second column. The sets of keywords encompass the content of each
discourse in abstract terms, including the main arguments and justiﬁcations in it. These
keywords were developed based on the broader meaning of each discourse, and
capture the main arguments, justiﬁcations and motivations found in the statements
characterizing the discourse. Thus, the four discourses act as a coding scheme by which
we analyze the newspaper statements.
The keywords serve as mutually exclusive vignettes developed for each discourse. This
allows us to code each media statement in a binary manner. We matched the broader
meaning of each statement from media to the sets of keywords deﬁning the four
discourses. A statement matching one or more of the keywords, developed for each
discourse, is considered to match the respective discourse. If a statement ﬁts a discourse,
it was coded ‘1ʹ on this respective discourse; if not, it received ‘0ʹ. Two researchers
independently coded a total of 284 statements from both newspapers, which yielded
a Cohen’s kappa of 0.6967. This is a substantial level of agreement, using the benchmarks
proposed by Landis and Koch (1977, 165). The two researchers then concurred on the
coding of the remaining (20.8 percent) statements with initial disagreement. All state-
ments that appear in the media but do not ﬁt the vignette template were coded ‘0ʹ for all
four discourses. It is these statements that allow us to measure the size of the public-elite
gap on European integration, and simultaneously to investigate those aspects of the
Table 1. From characterizing statements to keywords: The citizen discourse in Serbia on ‘Mistrust and
hostility’.
Characterizing statements based on centroid analysis Keywords
Agreement: Which one of the less developed countries that has
become EU member is better oﬀ at present? None. (19) It would
have been nice to have our own economy. So that we don’t need
the EU. To be able to export our own products and not pay any
duties. (49) I am against EU membership. (12)
● doubt about economic development;
● economic costs for Serbia;
● rejection of membership;
Serbia shall not accept everything oﬀered to it by the EU. (61) The
terms for EU membership that are imposed on Serbia have not
been imposed on the other countries, in the political sense for
instance – the separation of Kosovo. I am afraid this tension will
continue to build up. (47) All this talk about the integration into EU
is quite meaningless – ‘empty stories’ – the way it is used by the
politicians to convince the people to do things that politicians
otherwise can’t. (48)
The EU will destroy even what little Serbia has. (37) The question is
whether we are competitive at all in the EU in the ﬁeld of
agriculture. (24) EU would sooner fall apart rather than we would
become a member. (17)
● opposition to EU conditions;
● unfair, unclear and changing conditions;
● imposing ‘separation of Kosovo’;
● tensions with Pristina;
● negative impact of integration on society;
● loss of national sovereignty and competence;
● EU’s internal instability;
Disagreement: I think that we will be better oﬀ for sure when we
enter the EU. (34) Simply the countries that are not as developed,
for instance Serbia and the other countries in the region, are
welcome in the EU due to the opening of some new markets, the
investments and expansion in some new ﬁelds of inﬂuence. (25)
No, the countries that have become EU member states have not
lost anything. They have not lost absolutely anything. (20)
● negative impact of previous enlargements;
● EU’s disintegration;
● mistrust in EU institutions;
● mistrust in Serbia’s EU prospects;
● accession negotiations more diﬃcult;
● threat to national security and foreign
relations.
Source: the statements from Dimitrova and Kortenska (2016)
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political debate that citizens ﬁlter out and substitute with own experiences or other
contextual proxies in making up their minds about EU.
Of course, the use of keywords based on distinguishing statements from the initial
discourse analysis using Q are two diﬀerent methods. This may lead to the wrong
classiﬁcation of some newspaper statements to discourses, or the inability to link
a newspaper statement to the existing discourses. In particular, the latter would be
a problem for our research, as it may contribute to the rejection of our base-line hypoth-
esis. Our impression is that this potential bias is rather limited. The intercoder reliability is
quite high, suggesting that both independent coders were able to use our framework.
Moreover, we are able to construct a clear story based on the statements that do not ﬁt,
which indicates that they are more than just noise.
4. Media-elite versus citizen discourses: a gap in understandings
After coding all of the statements, we ran a simple frequency analysis in order to see how
the total number of statements from media is distributed and to what extent these four
discourses are represented in the broader discursive space moving from citizens to the
communicative or intermediary discourses of elites.
Before presenting our results, it is important to note a few broad observations. First,
statements by the two main governing parties (the Serbian Progressive Party and Socialist
Party of Serbia) and the negotiating team are far more predominant in Politika than in
Danas. Second, Politika has dedicated much more space and time to the issue of EU
enlargement and Serbia’s progress in signing accession negotiations – given that the
number of news articles in Politika is much higher than in Danas for the same period of
time. That is, in the total set of 284 statements, about two thirds (216 entries) are found in
the newspaper of the ‘establishment’, Politika.
Table 2 summarizes the results of our frequency analyses of media content. It contains
frequencies including repeated statements and those without. The analysis shows that all
four discourses are represented in the media in a total of 228 statements. From this subset
of statements, 20 statements ﬁt in more than one discourse: 10 statements ﬁt discourses
A and C, 10 statements ﬁt discourses A and D, and one ﬁts discourses C and D.4 This seems
logical given the similarities between these three discourses providing a supportive
position towards enlargement.
Table 2. Frequency of media statements classiﬁed by citizen discourse.
All media statements
(n = 284)
Non-duplicate statements
(n = 262)
Discourse A – Cautiously Positive Expectations 133 115
(46.8%) (43.9%)
Discourse B – Mistrust and Hostility 17 17
(6.0%) (6.5%)
Discourse C – The Devil’s in the Conditions 46 45
(16.2%) (17.2%)
Discourse D – Moving towards EU Rules and
Institutions
43 38
(15.1%) (14.5%)
Statements not ﬁtting any citizen discourse 66 64
(23.2%) (24.4%)
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The match between media and citizen discourses amounts 75.6 percent, which in our
view captures the mass-elite linkage which some scholars have previously addressed
(Steenbergen, Edwards, and de Vries 2007; Ray 2003). It emphasizes the similarities in
discourses between elites and the public. However, 66 statements, or 24.4 per cent of
media coverage analyzed, are out of the scope of citizen discourses about EU enlarge-
ment. This percentage represents, in our view, the dissimilarity between elite and citizen
discourses, in the sense that elites use many more statements than we can trace back to
citizen discourses. This is the size of the gap between elites and the public, which has
been hypothesized in this article. These statements deﬁne a substantive diﬀerence in view
between citizens and domestic political elites on Serbia’s accession. Before focusing the
public-elite gap, we ﬁrst outline the way the media content matches the four citizen
discourses.
4.1. Citizens and elites in resonance: (mis-) matching support
In contrast to rather pessimistic prognoses in public opinion surveys, the discursive
approach to the study of citizen attitudes appears much more optimistic. We ﬁnd that
the highest share of media statements aligns with Discourse A ‘Cautiously Positive
Expectations’, which expresses high level of support driven by predominantly rational
and utilitarian justiﬁcations. Yet, this discourse views Serbia as still having a long road
before becoming an oﬃcial EU member state in terms of reforms and preparations. This
discourse rejects claims of identity or sovereignty loss, or economic costs. Accordingly,
media statements which ﬁt this discourse resort predominantly to arguments of eco-
nomic beneﬁts, better standards of living, and of domestic reforms. The elite discourse
steers away from identity-related arguments. Discourse B ‘Mistrust and Hostility’, on the
other hand, is least represented in the print media, with only six per cent of the collected
media statements matching its vignette. This ﬁnding appears counterintuitive given the
negative trends in public opinion data and has signiﬁcantly diﬀerent policy implications
for the future enlargement rounds and the accession of Serbia in particular then surveys
suggest.
What is interesting about Discourse B is that all 17 newspaper statements that ﬁt its
frame quote members of the opposition Democratic Party of Serbia. Fourteen of these
statements are made by the party leader Vojislav Koštunica. His claim about the economic
costs and loss for Serbia due to the EU integration are fully in line with the rationale we
ﬁnd in the ‘Mistrust and Hostility’ discourse among citizens. It remains unclear from the
analyses whether the shared understandings of this discourse have been cued by these
political leaders. The opposite could be true as well: leaders such as Koštunica and other
political entrepreneurs may have detected increasing dissatisfaction and opposition
among the constituencies, and adopted a speciﬁc rhetoric in an eﬀort for domestic vote-
maximization.
Discourses C and D, which are both broadly supportive of EU enlargement, appear at
similar levels in the media statements as indicated in the table. Furthermore, 10 of the
statements assigned to Discourses C and D match the reasoning found in Discourse A as
well. This re-emphasizes the systematic similarities which occur across these discourses
that are all positive towards accession, but diﬀer in their justiﬁcations of support. The
match between Discourse C ‘The Devil’s in the Conditions’ and media statements
10 E. KORTENSKA ET AL.
illustrates the importance of country-speciﬁc criteria within the context of enlargement
policy in shaping citizen perceptions.5
The enlargement process in Serbia includes the EU-led Belgrade-Pristina dialogue as
a major condition for accession (Kmezić 2015). It is also the reason for delays and impasse
in EU-Serbia relations. The distinction between recognizing Kosovo’s independence as
opposed to normalizing relations between Belgrade and Pristina being an EU condition
remains unclear to citizens, included in Discourse C. They do not diﬀerentiate between
Chapter 35 (on these relations) and other chapters and are afraid that EU conditions will
‘force’ the Serbian government to recognize Kosovo’s independence. This automatically
leads to a rejection of Serbia’s membership, even though citizens acknowledge the
potential positive eﬀects of accession on the development of Serbia. Indeed, media
statements that refer to the Kosovo issue signal ambiguity and uncertainty within the
elites’ rhetoric. While some clearly state that the Chapter 35 conditions and the Brussels
Agreement are designed to normalize relations between Kosovo and Serbia, they do not
mention recognition of Kosovo’s status. Evidently, the ambiguity on the Kosovo question
in the media is in line with the uncertainty among citizens. Elite cues relating to economic
beneﬁts of European integration, which are prevalent in the media, may not be eﬀective
in persuading citizens adhering to this discourse to change their mind with regards to the
recognition of Kosovo as a condition for membership.
4.2. Citizens and elites in dissonance: the public-elite gap
The statements that do not ﬁt any of the citizen discourses are interesting, since these
statements not only indicate the size but also the content of the public-elite gap.
Table 3 illustrates some of the issues in the media statements that are not found in the
citizen discourses. First, the discourses among citizens do not refer to the start of
accession negotiations as a historical achievement for Serbia. This was voiced predomi-
nantly by Prime Minister Ivica Dačić in January 2014, when the negotiations oﬃcially
began. Of the statements that did not ﬁt in with the dominant citizen discourses on EU
accession, 17 (25.8 percent) alluded to the historic achievement of opening membership
negotiations. This is in sharp contrast to the overarching ‘Return to Europe’ rhetoric
shared by citizens and elites regarding the accession with Central and East-European
candidates in the 1990s (Schimmelfennig 2001).
Second, citizens do not discuss the eﬀects of an early general election on the process of
Serbia’s accession negotiations. Seven of the media statements (10.6 percent) referred to
the upcoming national elections. This is not surprising due to the timing of the media
data. Domestic political parties attempted to posture before the poll, while others
assessed whether the elections would be disruptive to accession and Pristina-Belgrade
negotiations.
Third, a mismatch in communication appears on the technical aspects of enlargement
process. Details referring to the intricacies of the process are largely absent in the four
discourses among citizens. Details about who will lead the Serbian negotiation team, how
domestic leaders cooperate, the sequencing of chapter negotiations, and institutional
steps required remain outside of the scope of citizen discourses. A total of 13 media
statements (19.7 percent) were comments by Tanja Miščević, the Serbian Government
Chief Negotiator.
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Fourth, four statements (6.1 percent) referred to exact dates of expected accession and
importance of accession for the Western Balkans. Another three statements (4.5 percent)
mentioned a potential referendum on the EU Accession Treaty in Serbia. These have been
completely ignored by citizens, for whom referendum is not central to their viewpoints.
Citizens also do not refer at all to a particular timeframe for accession, even though they
have expectations about the speed and quality of Serbia’s preparation.
What is interesting is that regional reconciliation and security, which is at the heart of the
EU Stabilization and Association process, only appears at the margins of communicative
elite discourses in the media and is negligible amongst citizen discourses. The remaining 18
statements (27.3 percent) cover a range of low-key topics, including bilateral cooperation
with Slovakia and public attitudes amongst member states about Serbian candidacy. While
the media pays some attention to the details related to opening negotiation chapters,
citizens ignore these aspects and instead rely on personal experiences in national and local
socio-economic and political aﬀairs. Indeed, political elites are closer to the negotiation
process and thus the media content reﬂects on their direct engagement in it in terms of
negotiations progress, chapters sequencing and the details of the negotiations.
5. Conclusion
This article explores the links between political elites and citizens in discourses on
European integration. Studying the discourses in Serbia provides the opportunity to
examine these relationships in a country in which discussions on European integration
are highly politicized, and a gap between political elites and citizens can occur. We ﬁnd
Table 3. Prevalent topics for media statements not matching citizen discourses.
Topic Speaker Example
Historic achievement Ivica Dačić (PM) Ahead of tomorrow’s ﬁrst intergovernmental conference with
the EU in Brussels, Serbian Prime Minister Ivica Dačić says
that he is proud to be one of the few Serbian prime
ministers who achieved historical results which future
generations will remember.
Aleksandar Vučić (deputy PM) Vučić says that today is an important and big day for Serbia.
Technicalities Tanja Miščević (Chief
Negotiator)
Asked for a negotiating framework, she said that the
document will contain the principles of negotiation and
that this document, as well as the introductory statement
at the intergovernmental conference will be published on
the website of the government of Serbia, noting that both
documents must be made public.
Anonymous (Serbian
negotiator)
Politika’s source in the Serbian negotiation team said that
Belgrade insists on opening three chapters in June, the
above-mentioned Chapter 32, then the Chapter 35 relating
to Kosovo, as well as one of the so-called easy chapters
which do not contain too many EU legal norms, such as
Chapter 25 (science and research) or 26 (education and
culture).
National Election Tanja Miščević (Chief
Negotiator)
Asked whether the elections would slow the integration
process, she said: ‘Not necessarily, if they were organized
faster with a short electoral campaign.’
Ivica Dačić (PM) We’ll make sure that Serbia doesn’t lag behind in the EU
integration process, despite the ongoing electoral
campaign. It means that the elections should not aﬀect the
process of integration, or the implementation of reforms
and, certainly not, the dialogue with Pristina, Dačić said.
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that in both major national newspapers all four discourses identiﬁed in Dimitrova and
Kortenska (2016) are present. The pro-European discourse ‘Cautiously Positive
Expectations’ is most prominent, which makes positive claims about EU enlargement
and its eﬀects on Serbia’s economy and citizens. Furthermore, attention is given to the
Kosovo question, pointing to diﬀerent ideas about the future eﬀects these issues may
have on Serbia’s accession negotiations.
Our results conﬁrm the limited-overlap hypothesis, implying that there is a discursive
gap, which is expected at times of major societal change. In our research, we found that
some media content reﬂecting elite discourses does not appear in citizen discourses.
These new elite cues, which do not match citizen discourses, may be the result of
unsuccessful attempts of changing current discourses or a search for alternative ones.
In the case of Serbia, elites appear to be more engaged with the process of enlargement,
while citizens are concerned about its implications. More generally, this gap illustrates
that, especially when it comes to mass processes in society, cue-making and cue-taking
have all kinds of imperfections, which aﬀect the correspondence between elite politics
and citizen views.
Given the authoritarian past in Serbia, and generally weak civil society and civic
mobilization, it could be expected that even in times of political change, there is
a strong top-down link between EU and Serbian elites aiming to aﬀect through commu-
nicating discourses in the media, the discourses of citizens. This traditional pathway is
quite central to the literature. The existence of the four citizen discourses in the media
suggest that this transmission has taken place. The correspondence between elite and
media are particularly strong, especially in Politika, since it is the newspaper of the
establishment. The predominance of the positive statements might correspond to the
consensus around accession coordinated by EU and domestic elites.
The cautiously optimistic statements suggest that elites are not unfettered and are
instead constrained by domestic factors and electoral appeal to citizens, particularly with
the opposition invoking the ‘Mistrust and Hostility’ discourse. This nuances the idea of
cueing as a two-way street. Citizen discourses do resonate with the statements in com-
municative discourses presented in the media. At the same time, these discourses do not
fully reﬂect the stances of governing elites and ﬁlter some of the cues provided to them.
There is no citizen discourse that is completely absent from media, but they are also not
equally present.
With this in mind, a major discrepancy between elites and citizens is the lack of
historically motivated rhetoric among the latter. This distinguishes the enlargement
process of ex-Yugoslav countries from the earlier process in Central and Eastern Europe.
Accession in Central and Eastern Europe was imbued with a strong pro-EU bridging
discourse on the ‘Reuniﬁcation of Europe’ that resonated among both citizens and
political elites within candidate countries (Dimitrova and Kortenska 2017). Such discourse
is absent in the citizen discussions in Serbia, even though we ﬁnd some of this rhetoric in
the media. Another ﬁnding is that there is only minimal reference to the EU as a broker of
regional security, cooperation, and peace. Citizens seem to downplay this aspect of
enlargement, even though security and stability in the region is one of the EU’s under-
lying rationales behind EU enlargement.
Our article shows that we are able to join up discourse analyses from citizen focus
groups with discourse analyses of elites using national media from a speciﬁc period in
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time. From a substantive point of view, we show that the key components of the EU’s
enlargement strategy – justice, stability, and ‘returning to Europe’ – do not ﬁlter down
to citizens. The positivity towards EU integration amongst citizens is based on oppor-
tunity and pragmatism. If the EU and Serbian elites are serious about eﬀectively
communicating an inclusive environment during the accession process, they should
further emphasize the discourses around opportunity and pragmatism in moving
forward.
Notes
1. Based on the original dataset, we calculated the correlations between the diﬀerent factors
representing the discourses, which are, in general, rather low. The correlation is slightly
higher (0.32) between the anti-EU discourse on mistrust and hostility (B) and the critical
discourse on national elites about moving towards EU rules (D). The other correlations are
−0.16 between A-B; 0.11 between A-C; 0.04 between A-D; −0.08 between B-C; and 0.23
between C-D (the capital letters refer to the labels of the discourses mentioned in the
text).
2. The Politika website has a searchable online archive sub-divided by day. We searched the
term ‘evrop*’ identify relevant articles related to EU accession. An automated search was not
possible for Danas, so we examined the papers’ politics, economy, and society sections.
Within each relevant article, the statements on EU accession were separated by the individual
speaker, and comprised of one or more sentences. For each statement, we recorded the date
of newspaper article; name of individual making statement; original statement (in Serbian);
translated statement (in English); newspaper article title; and article URL.
3. See doi.org/10.7910/DVN/WYG5RV for coding schemes and data.
4. We counted them in both discourses in which they appear, making the total percentage
higher than 100 percent.
5. There is no substantial diﬀerence in the distribution of discourses between the two news-
papers. Within the Danas and Politika statements, respectively: 51.47% versus 45.37% were
from Discourse A; 10.29% versus 4.63% were from Discourse B; 11.76% versus 17.59% were
from Discourse C; and 14.71% versus 15.28% were from Discourse D. The discursive gap is
also similar, with 19.12% and 24.54% of the statements from Danas and Politika, respectively,
not ﬁtting any of the citizen discourses.
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